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Your fingers would remember their old strength better...  
if they grasped your sword. 
Gandalf  
(from the movie The Two Towers,  
second part of Lord of the Rings movie)  
One of the most common questions in today’s cognitive studies is the one re-
garding embodied cognition. The answer to this question draws our attention 
to many factors, including bodily actions, which also work to embody cogni-
tion. With this in mind, enactivism is included in discussions of embodiment. 
In the current issue we present texts in which a focus on enactivism itself is 
the leading topic. 
If one were to describe declaratively the latest trend in cognitive studies, one 
would frequently refer to it as “embodied cognitive science”—sometimes with 
the addition of “radical embodied cognitive science”—or “enactive cognitive 
science”. However, attempts at answering the question regarding the relations 
of range and meaning between these terms set in motion a never-ending dis-
cussion. The issues connected with embodied cognition and enactivism 
tend to refer back to areas outside the field of cognitive studies. Including the 
category of embodiment (often quite contingently connected with situated 
and distributed cognition) within the context of enactivism, whose methodo-
logical and historical-ideological status is ambiguous (is it a methodological 
approach? a trend?), generates additional problems and questions. 
An attempt at introducing some order into the situation would require setting 
clear criteria and conducting a detailed notion analysis. One should always 
take into account various ways and contexts of using the categories of embod-
iment and enaction, which seem to lead us into the even broader waters of 
interdisciplinary studies. This is compounded by the additional problems 
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faced by the fields in which the aforementioned discussions are conducted—
including cognitive studies and interdisciplinary studies, and especially phi-
losophy and psychology in particular. However, the present introduction does 
not aim at bringing order to these various levels on which enactive issues ap-
pear. Furthermore, there is also no guarantee that ordering is reasonable, 
necessary, or efficient for research, and whether this is even possible. 
A certain common notional basis for enactivism is often pointed towards; it is 
comprised of such notions as autonomy, sense-making, structural coupling, 
self-organisation, agency, action, and sensorimotor dependencies. It is still 
a long way from showing the relations between these notions and from unify-
ing enactivisms into one common theoretical proposal in a satisfactory man-
ner. However, not only does this not stop the researchers, but it also encour-
ages them to further—especially critical—studies, which will allow enactivism 
to discover itself anew. 
At present, enactivism is explored in several partially different directions. 
From the radical biological roots of the theory of autopoiesis (Varela and 
Maturana), currently frequently referred to in the context of research on arti-
ficial life (Di Paolo, Froese), to research on cognition carried out through the 
sensorimotor system (Noë, O’Regan), to the role of interactions in social cogni-
tion and sense-making (de Jaeger, Gallagher), to seeking models of mind and 
the role of procedural knowledge in cognition (Hutto), a strong emphasis on 
the constructive character of cognition (Maturana) or pointing towards the 
key role of self-organisation and emotions in cognition (Ellis, Newton). The 
hereinabove distinguished notion basis refers precisely to all these issues. 
These remarks do not solve the issue of the variety of enactivism, but only 
point towards it. 
“Enactivism” has its terminological source which is turning attention towards 
the role of very broadly understood actions as the key to understanding what 
cognition is. Shaun Gallagher (2013: 209) writes: 
The enactive view of human cognition starts with the idea that we are action 
oriented. Our ability to make sense of the world comes from an active and 
pragmatic engagement with the world, along with our capacities to interact with 
other people. 
McGann et al. (2013) are comparing cognition to a handshake and to dancing. 
They write that we have to use cognition when it is taking place, when it con-
stitutes the action we are currently performing. This differentiates the enac-
tivism from the concept of action. Much of research on action is—at least in 
light of some enactivist works—anti- or at least non-enactivist. Enactivism 
equates cognition with action, but it defines the criteria of “action” in its own 
way, focusing on its very performance. Other concepts focus on the mecha-
nisms that make action possible. 
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The enactivist, equating cognition with performing actions, finds the results in 
research on cognition being something akin to catching a flying ball. To put it 
differently—analogically from Gandalf’s words to King Théoden—cognition 
happens when, in a specific context and with a specific tool (here: a sword), 
we start performing an action. This framing has both its advantages (e.g. ob-
serving cognition in statu nascendi may reveal many properties of the act of 
cognition), and disadvantages (it is possible that many of the processes that 
make acting possible do not reveal their basic properties only through action). 
Although the enactivist proposal seems very inspiring, is it enough for a revo-
lution in, or a unification of, cognitive studies? 
What seems to connect the enactivists, besides pointing towards action or to-
wards a certain particular practice of cognition, is rejecting the existence of 
mental representations or their necessity for explaining the essence of cogni-
tion. However, the situation is more complex than it may initially seem. On 
the one hand, not all enactivists reject the concept of representations (e.g. Na-
tika Newton), and on the other hand—a certain issue is located in the very 
status of representations criticised by enactivists, as well as the potential con-
cepts of representation insusceptible to the critique of the enactivists (see: 
Steiner in the current issue). The same pertains to the notions we have listed 
above. Not every enactivist refers to such notions as self-organisation, auto-
nomy, or sense-making, and the authors who do reach for them differ in their 
interpretations of these notions. 
The present issue consists mainly of ten articles that are ten standpoints on 
enactivism: not only from the point of view of the critics (Aizawa, Steiner, 
Cummins, Bielecka) and the proponents (Gallagher & Brower, Ellis, Li and 
Winchester), but also spokespeople for the moderate approach (Reid, Briscoe, 
Petit). Let us briefly outline the contents of the main part of the volume. 
Aizawa (in this issue, as in: Aizawa 2014) presents doubts regarding enactiv-
ism, focusing on the category of “cognition”, central to cognitive studies. Ha-
ving shown why differentiating between cognition and behaviour is im-
portant for cognitive scientists, Aizawa analyses a number of works by enac-
tivists in order to show that they frequently mistake cognition for behaviour. 
Steiner considers the enactivist critique of representationalism, showing that 
on the one hand, enactivists do not present a unified concept of representa-
tion in their critique, and, on the other hand, there are possibly such (non-
referential) concepts of representation that are immune to this critique. Bie-
lecka proves that the radically externalist theory of content, as present in 
Manzotti’s research, is not possible to support, pointing towards the doubtful 
concept of hallucinations by this author. Cummins criticises the basic notions 
of agency and autonomy, highlighting the fact that they are frequently mis-
taken by researchers. Briscoe, focuses on the spatial contents of experience 
and the meaning that “motor system” has for it, he presents Evans’ (1982) con-
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cept as an alternative to Alva Noë’s activism and proposes a concept that is 
more consistent with current empirical studies (while connecting Evans’ con-
cept with Millikan’s (1984) research pertaining to mental representations). 
Petit develops his own interpretation of neurophenomenology (one of the el-
ements of the enactivist programme), focusing on the brain mechanims of 
consciousness. Ellis also turns towards the functioning of the central nervous 
system, analysing the role of emotions, self-organisation and anticipation in 
consciousness, and using this point of view to criticise determinist and epi-
phenomenalist concepts of consciousness. Gallagher and Bower, while trying 
to make enactivism more embodied, point towards the important role of emo-
tions and social factors; moreover (as with the two previous authors) they 
consider the way in which the functioning of the brain should be interpreted 
in the light of enactivism, especially in the context of research on predictive 
cognition. Some works consider the applied side of enactivism. The neuro-
phenomenology mentioned above (see article by Petit) is one of the applica-
tions. Li and Winchester reflect on the concept of Freedom Education, show-
casing both its advantages and its potential cohesion with the enactivist pro-
gramme. In his interesting, historically grounded essay, Reid considers the 
relationship between enactivism and theories of teaching, as well as the po-
tential pros and cons of enactivism in these theories, especially in concepts 
pertaining to teaching mathematics. 
In a broader sense, the abovementioned articles can be significantly comple-
mented by two interviews: one with Shaun Gallagher, and the other with Rob-
ert Rupert; they are able to direct the attention of the Readers towards more 
broadly conceived issues connected with situating cognitive processes. 
This concludes a broad overview of the current issue. Before we invite you to 
read the articles collected herein, we will allow ourselves a few more re-
marks. We can sometimes notice certain continuities in the presented set of 
texts. One of the continued threads is the criticism of basic notions of enacti-
vism. Aizawa ponders the direction for development and the character of the 
enactivist revolution. His attention focuses on whether the concept enactivists 
consider to be cognition should be called cognition at all. He claims that what 
we have to make do with here is something that was classically considered 
behaviour, and that makes the status of enactivism in cognitive studies espe-
cially interesting. According to the classical approach, it was behavior that 
was explained (explanandum), while the theories of cognition were supposed 
to explain this behaviour (they were explanantia). Enactivists—as Aizawa 
writes—on the one hand, consider cognition to be explanandum, and, on the 
other, reduce cognition to a form of behaviour. As a result, we have to make 
do with a particular, cognitive-enactive mixture of explananda and explanan-
tia, declaratively incompatible, but at the same time, in fact and quite per-
versely compatible with classical cognitive science. Steiner critically presents 
the issue of relations between enactivism and representational concepts of 
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cognition. In his critical reflections, Cummins reaches for the basic notions of 
the first wave of enactivist research. These works, together with Petit’s and 
Bielecka’s texts, point towards the weaknesses of enactivist proposals. As we 
believe, such approaches and their consequences are indispensable in order 
for enactivism to be able to develop fully and overcome the problems it en-
counters. Both internal and external criticism are not to be underesti-
mated here2. 
Gallagher and Bower—authors deriving from phenomenological back-
grounds—consider the role of the nervous system in discussing enactivism in 
general. A similar path is pursued by Petit, who discusses one of the research 
programmes of enactivism: neurophenomenology, as well as by Ellis, who 
criticises the determinist concepts of consciousness. Such a strong interest in 
the central nervous system seems to be both surprising and valuable, as it 
makes possible the meeting of enactivism with the main trend of neurocogni-
tive studies, as well as a reflection (in the light of these studies) on the partici-
patory (Gallagher and Bower) and anticipating (Ellis) concepts of CUN, and 
also the role of time synchronizations in consciousness (Petit). 
In the aforementioned articles we find references to Varela and Maturana’s 
version of enactivism (Aizawa, Cummins, Steiner, Li & Winchester, Ellis), as 
well as to the enactivist (or activist) proposals of Alva Noë (Briscoe), to Ellis 
and Newton’s framing of enactivism (Ellis), enactivism as proposed by Daniel 
Hutto (Aizawa) or enactivism in robotics (Bielecka). It is, however, visible that 
the role of the beginnings of the idea of enactivism remains not to be underes-
timated, as although the works we have collected frequently refer to very ad-
vanced, recent studies, they do not—as we can see—disregard the roots that 
can undoubtedly be located in Varela and Maturana’s research. 
Referring back to the quote that opens the present introduction, we can say 
that thanks to the aforementioned articles we can, in a certain way, get a hold 
on enactivism and face up to it, and, as a consequence, also to the problem of 
cognition. We believe that these works can (and should) constitute an im-
portant voice in the dispute over what the essence of enactivism (and also 
enaction) is, and what role it should play in research on cognition. This seems 
to be suggested both by the critical and the favourable framings of enactivism. 
                                                             
2 There have already appeared a number of voices criticising enactivism. In our opinion, among 
the most important of these is the review of Alva Noë’s first book written by Ned Block (2005) –
a review that, among its other features, charged enactivists (here: Noë) with crypto-behavio-
ralism, as well as mistaking causality for constitution. Additionally, there are interpretation prob-
lems concerning basic notions, such as sensomotorical contingencies. In one of her recent texts, 
Frederique de Vignemont attacks enactivism (which she equates with sensorimotor approaches, 
as Noë also did), arguing with the claim of the enactivists that every experience constitutes certain 
particular sensorimotor laws). According to this researcher, it is possible to separate such experi-
ences which—as it seems—cannot be connected with any laws of this kind (see: de Vignemont 
2011, 2014).  
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We hope that the contents of this volume will bring us closer to explaining at 
least some doubts referenced here and to realising what constitutes cognition 
according to enactivists—although they themselves believe that it is some-
thing as dynamic, momentary, and unstable as handshaking. 
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